Visualizing Invention

As we were writing THE POCKET GUIDE TO INVENTION WORKSHOPS Bob Sesek (HP super-inventor with 600 disclosures and forty-some patents issued) came up with a great graphic to visualize the inventing which was and was not happening.  Here it is:

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The blue boxes are ideasthat could be disclosed, but which are not disclosed.  The yellow boxes are disclosable ideas that are captured by an IP system.  Our workshops have shown that what IP attorneys suspect, is correct.  Very few of the technology ideas people have, are captured.

So far, so good.  I was back flipping because Bob came up with a way to show graphically, something I’ve been groping to articulate for a long time.

Next step in visualizing invention was a build on Bob’s idea that allowed “strategic” IP to be visualized as well.  Here is my build on Bob’s idea:

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What I like about this, is that what is strategic is separate from the idea of patentability.  Many of our clients don’t necessarily want 100% patenting of inventions captured.  They even want non-patentable ideas that are strategic.  Patentability is not the only source of worth of an invention disclosure.

So, I’m liking this graphic very much.  But, Bob hates it.  He does not like my most excellent 45 degree strategic patenting targets.  I liked my targets because they allowed me to show what happens when inventors get calibrated.  What happens when inventors learn the criteria their inventions are being evaluated with is that the inventing becomes like this:

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The inventors “get” that strategic ideas are important even when not patentable, and they mop up their minds of the un-disclosed remainder ideas.  Then, they efficiently disclose down the target list.  And when the idea quality is high enough, they can judge for themselves that the ideas should be turned in.

So, I’m happy, but Bob still thinks this stinks.  So, we got to talking about it, and realized that we see inventing in complementary ways.  Not a surprise, while I’ve got 4 issued patents, I see the world primarily as an IP manager, and Bob sees the world primarily as an inventor.  To stitch what Bob sees in strategic inventing, to what I’m seeing take a look at this:

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Bob sees ideas spread across technology space (Y axis) and then quality (X axis).  I was content to clumsily overlay strategic patenting targets on the frequency plot of ideas.  Bob then pulled the strategic patent targets off my density plot, and put the strategic targets where he sees that they naturally belong. That is, in the technology space.

So that is where we stand as of today.  We’re able to generate inventions across technologies and quality, in approximately normal distributions (see last image).  This feels like a stepping stone to predictive IP management, or something else cool.  Hope you enjoy!

Microsoft Excel

 

Eight Species of Patent Strategy – Part 3 how intellectual property management develops from level 3 to level 4

Part 1, Part 2

Intellectual Property Management in a Growing Soon-To-Be-Big Company:

Once a growing company signs its first cross license with a balancing payment going out, or has a “near death experience” with IP litigation, and/or loses a patent litigation, IP management gains its first proposition with senior management.  The value of IP becomes intuitively obvious in direct proportion to the IP costs externally imposed on senior management.

Level 3: “Defined” IP Management

This first value proposition allows IP management, for the first time, to put in place infrastructure in anticipation of where the business is going. Figure 1 displays how growing companies catch up on IP management by building out their IP programs from the prep and process capabilities.  The litigation function isn’t a base to build an IP management program from.  And we’re not exactly sure why.  Perhaps because litigators tend to be success narcissists that are too self absorbed to design any system that can succeed without them.  Whatever the reason, we’ve only seen clients trying to build patent management by expanding out from prep and process.

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Figure 1: Level Three “Defined” IP Management Maturity

A key article on IP management “Intellectual Property Management From Theory To Practice” by Steve Fox is now available on the internet as well as in Patrick Sullivan’s 1998 Profiting From Intellectual Capital.  The two key contributions of this article are: (a) envisioning IP management as a closed-loop feedback system, (b) explicitly developing intellectual property targets for IP to be invented to.   This article is a key advance in IP management because it gets the legal department thinking outside of the two default mental boxes (Prep and Process and Litigation).  Figure 2 displays the four species of patent management Fox articulated.

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Figure 2: Yellow Indicates Areas of IP Management Added by Steve Fox’s 1998 Article

In fact, one could argue that Fox in addition to the yellow, articulated “Define the IP Business Model” and “Generate and Capture IP” while he was managing HP’s intellectual property.  The IP business model during Fox’s tenure was implicit: “grow the patent portfolio to reduce, then remove, the reverse the balancing payments accompanying HP’s cross licenses.”  And to generate and capture IP, Fox sponsored invention workshops.

Level 4: “Closed Loop” IP Management

Returning to the discussion of IP management levels, the point that is important, is that IP management needs some sort of funding model.  Initially a funding model is needed for the litigation and prep and process functions.  Later, as the IP managers grow in experience, sophistication, and understanding of how to produce value with the IP a company can generate, an additional funding model is needed.  The second funding model of IP management allows infrastructure and staffing to manage the six functions of IP management beyond litigation and prep and process.

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Figure 3: Level 4 “Closed Loop” IP Management

Level 4 IP management is the first time since a firm’s founding, that IP management is beginning to catch up to the firm’s growth.  The reason the colored pie slices do not reach all the way to the edge of the black circle in Figure 3, is that while all eight IP management functions are being accomplished in a level 4 company, the legal organization and the “true believer” technical volunteers helping it, do not have the capacity to fully engage the entire organization.

Think about it, the legal organization has been behind and working hard to catch up to externally imposed litigation and licensing requirements for the company’s entire history.  The chances that external licensing and litigation are likely to grow the company’s legal department to just the right size to train and equip tens of thousands of employees, is zero.  Legal departments that are cost centers, are eternally cursed with always being too small to fill the potential of IP in their organizations.  Too small for the next wave of crises.  Too small for firm wide training and enrollment in IP programs.  Too small to annually restart the IP program in the firm.  And further, legal departments don’t have the correct kinds of people in them to be the sole owners of an IP management program.

To define the IP business model it is great to have lawyers and CTOs, but in addition you need finance people, you need sales people who are going to make the IP monetization stick on real licensing partners.  To target profitable IP you need attorneys and CTOs, but in addition you need to search out the “paradigm pioneers” in the organization.  The technical and marketing geniuses who are already simulating how the next wave of technology will work in their minds, who are upsetting the old guard and senior architects with their prophecies of doom and ultimatums to switch architecture before the “technical apocalypse.”   To generate and capture IP it is great to have guidance from CTOs and lawyers, but you also need evangelists, showmen, and administrative infrastructure.  To set up an excellent IP triage system you need CTOs and lawyers, but you also need decision scientists who can show patent committees how maximize effectiveness at the same time as increasing efficiency.  To manage IP, law people are necessary but not sufficient.  Same goes for for business people.  IP management is inherently a cross disciplinary collaboration.  Professionals and “un-professionals” allied in getting all eight functions of patent strategy up and running profitably.  IP management responds to the division of labor, just like any value-producing activity.

Level 5: “Profit Maximizing” IP Management

The highest level of IP management is the profit maximizing.  IBM is the current master of IP management, with published statistics in 2000 showing that IBM’s licensing revenues from its IP portfolio as funding as much as 35% of IBMs research and development.

Level 5 IP management sees profits where level 1 through level 4 IP management sees costs.  With for-profit outbound licensing well under way the inflows of revenue do a wonderful job of clarifying management’s attention on intellectual property.  In addition to profitable IP management, level 5 companies can practice IP portfolio hygiene management.  Portfolio hygiene management in IBM’s case can be illustrated with 3 very large divestitures: networking equipment from IBM to Cisco, hard drive technology from IBM to Hitachi, and finally, the divestiture of IBM’s PC business.  All of these divestitures were accomplished in large measure through the transfer of intellectual assets.  Likewise IBM buys companies like Netezza that have strong patent portfolios (21 issued US patents and 22 US applications at the time of this writing according to Delphion).

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Figure 4: Level 5 “Profit Maximizing” IP Management and the other 4 levels of IP management

Concluding Thoughts:

We hope you’ve found the two analytical frameworks in this series to be interesting and illuminating.  We’ve been concept testing these frameworks on IP professionals for the past several months and have received substantial support from attorneys and patent agents alike.  The five levels of IP management framework in particular paints pictures of clients that every attorney recognizes.

The lingering question from our concept test meetings with IP professionals has been “Why are more companies not doing what IBM is doing.”  A great question for another day.  Thanks for reading!

 

Eight Species of Patent Strategy – Part 2 Five levels of IP management and how intellectual property management develops from stage 1 to stage 2

Part 1, Part 3

Introduction:

In part 1 of this article series on patent strategy we derived eight species of strategy from the steps a successful/profitable patent goes through over its lifetime.  In part 2 (this article) we are going to use the eight species framework to illustrate how intellectual property management evolves through five phases over the life cycle of a successful company.  In this article, we’ll review the basic framework from part 1, and then describe how IP business processes help us develop an IP management maturity taxonomy.  Then, level 1 “boot up” and level 2 “managed” IP maturity levels will be described in terms of business processes used for each IP management function.

Framework Review:

For a full description of each species of patent strategy, refer to yesterday’s post.  Figure 1 displays the framework and Table 1 has vignette length explanations of each strategy species.

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Figure 1: The Eight Species of IP Management Business Processes

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Table 1: Short Definitions of Each IP Management Business Process Type

Levels of IP Management:

Carnegie Mellon has since 1984 worked to measure the maturity of software organizations.  This research began at the request of the US Department of Defense as software projects proved to be strategic bottlenecks in getting high-quality defense systems completed on time and within budget.  Figure 3 and Table 2 display the characteristics of organizations as they range from level 1 to level 5 in software management maturity.  The big change across the 5 levels, is how process improvement changes.  In level 1 organization, there is no process improvement, because there are no processes.  In level 5 organization process improvement has become a coequal function to the actual software specification, development, and test.

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Figure 3: CMMI Maturity Level Characteristics
Source: Wikipedia

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Table 2: Capability Maturity Model Process View of Model
Source: Wikipedia

IP management is a complex, multidisciplinary, knowledge-based process, just like defense system software development.   Individuals working in IP management, like individuals working in defense software development, are unlikely to know about the existence of maturity levels.  At lower levels of maturity in both software and IP management systems, short-run individual behavior is largely determined by the system.  As IP management maturity increases, latitude for long-term initiative and individual autonomy open up.  Reactive behavior, is largely, predictable behavior.

We believe the eight species of IP management strategy help in understanding the five levels of IP management maturity.  In the sections that follow, we describe the business processes characteristic for each type of IP management strategy for each level of IP management.

Intellectual Property Management in Startups:

When you read about startups, in say Jessica Livingston’s excellent FOUNDERS AT WORK you quickly realize that there are important problems specific to startups, and intellectual property is not one of them.  Picking good partners, finding funding, using better tools, selling, all of these are critical in startups.  But, intellectual property is not, and in many ways, can not be important.

IP is not important because startups think in terms of break even and number of payrolls that they can cover with current assets.  Optimizing a startup by capturing and managing IP as an ongoing business process is like asking a 16 year old to invest in an annuity that will mature in 600 years.  While it may be profitable, there just isn’t any way to do this within the 16 year old’s mental framework.  Like the 16 year old, people sweating firmware, releases, products, and sales, do not have the emotional space and intellect to invest in a patent that might issue in 5 years and might be licensable in 15 years.

We think the big reason that isn’t important to startups, is that the first job of every startup is to pivot its business model until it generates product market fit.  Before a startup has a product market fit, all it has is prototypes and hypotheses.  If patents are files on prototypes and the markets they are hypothesized to fit, they are likely to be wasted.  Startups have to pivot their business models over and over before they find markets.  Reading books on high tech marketing by Guy Kawasaki, Geoffrey Moore, and Steve Blank have lead us to the conclusion that  more certain management is that it knows how a high tech market will evolve, the more likely it is to be wrong.

And while patent attorneys are only too eager to write patent applications on any novel, useful, non-obvious technology, and they are eager to get started on drafting patents as soon as possible, the fact remains that patents are not worth having if they don’t protect product market fit that a startup ends up with before growing.  Protection of early prototypes and hypothesized markets is worthless.  And most startups consequently, ignore IP.  Example: We’ve known Guy Kawasaki for 20 years, and we have never been able to get him excited about intellectual property management for his startups.

So, the standard starting point in an electronics startup company is displayed in Figure 3.  That is, no IP business model, no profitable IP targets, no capture, no triage, no prep and process, no portfolio management, no litigation until they are successful, no monetization strategy.  In a startup’s beginning, there is no IP management.

Figure 3: Level One “Boot Up” IP Management Maturity

Table 2 displays the business process to IP strategy matchup of a startup pre-success.  The startup is sweating finding a product market fit, until that fit is found, there isn’t any equity for a patent troll or other patent holder to siphon from a startup.  So, most startups coast without intellectual property management until they hit a level of success that becomes widely visible.

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Table 2: Pre-Litigation-Event IP Business Process to Strategy Species

Take for example, VIZIO the TV company.  They started in 2003 and did not attract litigation until 2006 when they were selling more than US$500,000,000 a year of products.  Look at Figure 4 and guess how many patent applications VIZIO filed in 2003, 2004, and 2005.

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Figure 4: VIZIO Sales (red) Patent Litigation (blue) and Patents (green)

Figure 5 shows that the first patent application on record for VIZIO was a design patent filed in October of 2006.  This is not proof that startups ignore intellectual property.  It is just an example of one startup and its experience with intellectual property.

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Figure 5: Visio Patenting Activity 2003-2008
Source: Delphion

But everything about intellectual property management changes for the startup once it becomes a sales success and it experiences its first patent infringement lawsuit.  For VIZIO the first suit hit in 2006 (blue bar in Figure 4). The startup company finds out that it has been sued, and needs to hire a general counsel, change legal firm or add a patent litigation literate firm to existing transactions counsel, just to have an “at bat” experience in its patent litigation.

Startup companies have no IP business processes and are reactive to IP crises.  Table 3 displays the state of IP management business processes immediately after a successful small company has been sued.  While before litigation, all eight species of IP business strategy were being ignored, immediately after litigation initiation, two business processes begin to receive management attention: Litigation and Prep and Process.

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Table 3: Post-Litigation-Event IP Business Process to Strategy Species

As ugly as litigation/licensing is, it is the gateway event to put an IP management program in place.  It is a gateway because litigation is so astronomically expensive.   For a big electronics company the cost is often $1,000,000 per month. These kind of costs create an instant management justification for the successful startup to begin to manage intellectual property.

A managerial light goes on and the founders of the company realize fully for the first time, that patents can prevent other companies from suing.  Because suits are so costly, preventing litigation with patents, is … valuable!  Litigation/licensing then moves IP management being nice “in theory” and stuck in a level 1: Boot Up, to a “business expense” that gets to level 2: “Managed” (see Figure 6).

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Figure 6: Level Two “Managed” IP Management Maturity

In this article in this series on eight species of patent strategy we have covered the basic framework, and then the idea of five levels of IP management existing through an analogy with software management and CMMI work at Carnegie Mellon.  The reason to bring in the idea of IP management maturity and five levels of maturity was to illustrate how the eight species of patent strategy are helpful for characterizing IP management.

Every IP program manages eight species of patent strategy.  And they manage these with business processes.  Initially the business processes used by startups (Level 1: Boot Up) are to ignore all eight species of patent strategy.  But when startups become successful they attract licensing programs, and litigation by patent trolls as well as legitimate patent-holding businesses.

Make it Personal:

By now, you are beginning to see the eight different kinds of patent strategy.  How these kinds of patent strategy can be extended to IP strategy in general.  And how each of these kinds of patent strategy are instantiated in business processes.  Now you can apply this framework to the IP management in your company.  What are the business processes your company uses to define its IP business model?  Does your company ignore IP business model?  Is your company in “boot up” mode or are you in “managed” mode with prep and process and litigation departments in your legal department?

In Part 3 of this series, we will work through the business processes that companies develop in level 3 “defined” and level 4 “closed-loop” IP management maturity, and finally level 5 “profit maximizing” IP Management.

Eight Species of Patent Strategy – Part 1 the framework

Part 2, Part 3

Introduction:

When invited to give a talk for an American Corporate Council Association (which changed its name to the Association of Corporate Council) in 2004 I was asked to speak on “patent strategy.”  When I complained “That is a pretty big topic, can you narrow it down a little for me?”  the answer was “No.  You are a great person to speak on patent strategy, just do the best you can with it.”

So, we invented an eight step analytical framework to make sense of all the kinds of patent strategies we had been involved in while managing intellectual property at HP, as well as an IP consultant with other clients.  Six years later, we am still using the same eight species of IP strategy in IP consulting and teaching, and we have found that clients and students see this analytical framework, and then immediately snatch it out of our hands.

As we work through our first book from BasicIP’s consulting practice experience running 240 invention workshops around the world, I’ve found this framework to be indispensable to laying out a step by step argument about why IP programs need invention workshops. The eight species framework has become the foundation on which we build new analytical tools.  So, just to be sure this framework isn’t shot full of holes I’ve been tricking local law firms in Boise (Zarian Midgley Johnson, Hawley Troxell, Buchannan-Nipper) former bosses, the IP manager training guru for the Licensing Executive Society, and even a local law school dean (Yes, Boise is getting its own law school!) into looking over this framework and seeing if they can see anything wrong with it.  So far, no problems.  So, the purpose of this blog post, is to work out the Eight Species IP framework in format that is a little more formal than the PowerPoint decks it has until now, called home.

The Eight Species of Patent Strategy Framework:

Figure 1 displays the eight species of patent strategy.  I derived these eight steps from the steps that a successfully licensed patent follows in its life cycle.

 

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Figure 1

The steps a successfully licensed patent should follow over its life cycle are as follows:

  1. A defined business model.  Principle: If you don’t know how you are going to monetize a patent before you apply, you are never going to monetize that patent.  Beginning with the end in mind is a Steven Covey principle.  Beginning with a profitable end in mind is closer to a law of nature when it comes to patents.  Example patent strategies that come out of defining IP business models might be IBM’s shifting to a for-profit IP business model under Gerstner (see 149 in his excellent book W.S.E.C.D.) to justify investing in research.  Or, a startup that has been small but that is becoming larger, may need to change business model from “hiding in the shadows of an industry” (a great place for every small company to start) to “buying oligopoly membership” as it grows.
  2. Targeting profitable IP.  If the IP management team is not specifying what it wants inventors to invent, then it won’t get what it needs.  Typical engineering management is very busy, not that confident in its IP knowledge or strategy ideas, and so the tyranny of the urgent crowds out making a list.  Example targeting strategies related to patents while I was at HP was Steve Fox’s mantra of “future looking, competitively preemptive, and gap filling” inventions that were wanted. While these are great general goals for targeting IP, the wise CTO will take these goals one step further and specify specific technologies from them.  For example, while I was at HP Boise in Y2K, we continued to receive halftoning invention disclosures – by then an “old” technology.  And when halftoning disclosures were filed as patents they cost more, took longer, and ended up capturing less, than an equivalent investment of money and inventor time in a future-looking technology like internet printing.  So decommissioning halftoning as an invention disclosure target would be a second example of a patent targeting strategy.  For a great example of making patent targets specific, see Steve Fox’s chapter (11) in Patrick Sullivan’s PROFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL.
  3. Generate and capture IP.  Generating and capturing involves training and dragooning.  If you look at how inventors come up to speed in your organization, you will find that about half of them require writing four to six invention disclosures before you can tell how good an inventor they will be.  The other half writes great disclosures from the start.  Training involves how you reach the non-instant-on half of your employees and providing them with the deliberate practice necessary for them to come up to speed inventing.  The dragooning involves everyone.  You can dragoon people into inventing in an infinite number of ways: with a simple “IP strip-mining” exercise, with an intensive off site brainstorming exercise, or by telling them they don’t get their paychecks until they fill out 6 enabled invention disclosures.  Or, you can give away iPods randomly to people filling out invention disclosures.  Whatever strategy you choose will be better than not having a strategy to dragoon inventions from people.   If you don’t have a dragooning strategy, you will capture =log(of what you should be seeing).  Most patent attorneys in companies have complained about “not seeing enough” from their inventors.  But few strategically dragoon their inventors.  Get a training and dragooning strategy.  They work well together!
  4. IP triage is what happens after an invention disclosure has been turned in, but before it is acted on.  The default triage strategy in most IP organizations is to sit around a table and read the invention disclosures and then invent rules for how to disposition the disclosures.  Every quarter another meeting is held, the rules are reinvented from a new set of invention disclosures.  The process repeats four times a year.  An improved triage strategy includes developing four 1 to 10 rating scales that each disclosure is rated on, having two or three independent raters rate all the disclosures, and then automatically dispositioning the disclosures without group discussion if they fall below X or above Y.  Then, the group discussions can be focused on defining what each of the four ratings scales mean, and discussing disclosures that generate ratings variations.
  5. Prep and process.  This is the stuff of patent agents and attorneys.  Prep and process is one of two species of patent strategy where every IP department scores at least a B is in prep and process.  This is craft.  Quality.  Goodness to attorneys and patent agents. So, I don’t talk much about prep and process strategies.
  6. Portfolio management.  There are many kinds of patent strategies involved in portfolios.  For example, international patenting.  Nobody can afford to file in every country, so a natural patent portfolio management strategy is a factorial design of IP across countries to cut down patent costs but to maintain enough coverage to protect products internationally. Another portfolio management strategy example would be to build a strong portfolio in a specific area to feed a licensing program. Another might be to defensively publish heavily around big patents that are obtained to preempt other companies from capturing improvement patents.  Portfolio management strategies are truly legion.  But today, almost all the contact most IP organizations have with portfolios is in deciding on patent maintenance fees.
  7. Litigation.  A second “B or above” patent strategy area for every IP organization.  Please note that litigation is the only species of the eight kinds of patent strategy, taught in law school.  Also note, that none of the eight species of patent strategy are taught in business schools.  In fact, the eight species of patent strategy are something of a “no man’s land” where companies have to paste together business processes the best they can to cover.
  8. Monetization.  Deciding how you are going to make money with your patents is one thing.  Cashing checks from IP is another.  There needs to be a lot of feedback between monetization and IP business model.  Business models that are so heavenly minded that they are no earthly good need to be tested and refined into monetizable business models.  Checks will not come back to your company for IP unless you have a strategy on how you are going to monetize the IP.  Managers need their feet held to the fire.  Business processes need to be set up, run, fed, refined, and refactored.

The next post in this series will talk about how IP strategies evolve in the wild of the electronics industry starting with stage one where a growing company has no IP strategy (see Figure 2).

 

The Eight Species of IP Strategy Framework - Birth

Figure 2


 

Please testdrive BasicIP’s forthcoming book!

Hey!

BasicIP is working on a book.  Title is POCKET GUIDE TO INVENTION WORKSHOPS.  The book starts at 100,000 feet with understanding the IP maturity of a given firm, and then zooms in on what the natural next steps are for building or maintaining IP maturity by running invention workshops.

BasicIP has run 245 invention workshops across the US, around the world, using a variety of simple (IP Strip mining) and complex (inVenti brainstorming) formats.  The purpose of the pocket guide is to take all our experience, pixie dust, and (stolen) theories, and get these on paper so the inventors of the world can become available to the IP departments of the world.

Like the East Texas oil field in the 1930s, the oil of invention, is only 6″ down but most IP departments don’t own a drill or pickaxe, so they walk over the top of their inventors and never appreciate what is available.

Anyway, the test drive site for the book is here.  If you’d take 30 minutes to blaze through the book (120 pages) at an over-view level, and tell us what you think (bill@basicip.com) we’d greatly appreciate your help!

Thanks!

bill meade

Technology Notables – Part 4: What features require notables?

Earlier articles in this series are available here: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3.

Figure 1 shows a 2×2 matrix of use benefit superiority vs. use-model maturity. The X-axis benefit superiority is a combination of features that have high value in use for customers or channel members, and ideally, some kind of competitive advantage.  With the Mopier 320 usage measurement, measuring toner was a big value add for the end customer, the competitive advantage was that we gave copier resellers a simple program that let them configure and monitor the device for their individual programs.  Our competitor at the time was Xerox and the mentality they had was apparently that only the mother ship could know about toner coverage.

The Y-axis in Figure 1 is use model maturity.  Toner coverage measurement was not a use model that copier dealers knew anything about.  They had strong economic interests to learn about it (benefit superiority) but no existing paradigm for managing variable toner costs as part of pay for page contracts. Writing notables is most effective when you write about strong economic needs that people know well, and non-existent use models.  So the sweet spot for notables is high benefit superiority and low use model maturity.

Figure 1

In Figure 1 the sweet spot is high and to the right.  Writing a notable in this quadrant, allows you to hypothesize how the benefit will fit into the customer’s life, and then test that hypothesis with real customers.  Because you are focusing on just one feature, your questions to the customer are clear.  Because you are focusing on a high benefit superiority target, your questions are interesting to the customer.

Notables in high benefit superiority/low use model maturity operate like sonar.  Each notable is a focused *ping* sent which then bounces off customers, channel members, users, etc. and brings back an echolocation signal.  This isn’t the best market research methodology in the world, but it is better than nothing.  The nothing alternative is to throw the product out into the market and watch what happens.

In theory you could write notables about every new feature in a software release.  In practice, there is not enough time to write about everything.  So, to optimize your effort, start with potential big features, and then work your way down in estimated impact.  Everyone likes having notables on big features or small, because notables are so much clearer than advertisements.  But be careful.  If you write notables on small features and say they are big, you are lying and will kill the signal to noise ratio that few notables on big features establish.

Generating hypotheses about customer need, and then testing, is how a software marketing function can iteratively articulate customer needs from an incipient state, into a want for a specific feature.   Figure 2 displays a wonderful idea from a Gordon Davis IBM Systems Journal article.  The basic idea is that the uncertainty of requirements should determine the research strategy used to gather requirements.

Note that Pleo, the animatronic dinosaur from Ugobe is placed at a pretty high degree of uncertainty.  With 14 motors, two Arm 7s and a bunch of little Hitachi controllers, Pleo was very complex.  It was more computer and artificial intelligence system, than toy.  And in the toy market, Pleo was by far the most complex toy in the competitive arena.  Pleo broke a lot of toy industry rules.  Pleo didn’t really have a precedent in the market.  So Pleo was inherently high uncertainty.

High uncertainty means that marketing for Pleo need to prototype.  Marketing needs to generate hypotheses about Pleo’s functionality and then test them on real customers, real context, real use situations.  Notables are probably not going to help a situation like Pleo’s where there are no use models, and the core need being filled is emotive.  One approach that might help in this situation would be to build a usability lab into the software organization writing code for Pleo.  Scheduling usability test every week and exposing software engineers to the cheers and jeers of customers using their code could give enough information to the programmers about the customer, to allow the software people to emulate the customer in their minds.

I don’t know how Pleo’s market research was conducted (if any).  But most organizations with market researchers suffer from over-professionalization and obsessive focus on low-uncertainty market research tools (i.e., “Asking” to the exclusion of all other research strategies).  High veracity prototype feedback is thrown out by this kind of pathological professionalism.  There appears to be no established body of high-uncertainty prototyping research in academic marketing.  Research that would correspond with say, agile software development.

While sending notables to customers for feedback, is an asking strategy.  Writing the notables is inherently a deriving strategy.  To derive how the customer will really engage with a feature, you learn as much as you can about the feature and customer, then you simulate both in your head.  So dealing with uncertainty can be accomplished by forcing yourself to inductively infer what will be going on when this feature engages the customer.  Market research before product release, always works from left (asking) towards the right of Figure 2.

With the Mopier 320 usage page, HP was able build prototypes usage pages with Microsoft Word months before the firmware was written.  These MS Word prototypes were shown to copier resellers in face to face meetings.  These meetings led to refinements in the design and then PDF documents were sent to other copier resellers for more feedback.  Once you get feedback across a customer community like copier resellers, that is focused on a single feature, you begin to develop an intuitive understanding of the range of variation in customer requirements.  HP didn’t have real context, or real purchase data.  But with real customers and a close enough to real prototype page, we were able to rapidly build an understanding of our customers and their economic challenges.

Lessons learned:

  1. The more professional your market research, the less it can help you with high uncertainty features and products.  You can test this generalization by showing this statement to the most professional market researcher you know.  When they hiss and sputter in response, you will see that what they lack in content assessing high uncertainty requirements, they make up for with pomposity.
  2. Incipient use models are a gold mine.  If you take initiative and simulate how the world should operate in your mind, and then test your assumptions on customers, you will rapidly take control of how the value of that software feature is captured.    With the usage page feature and notable, HP was able to reposition the Mopier 320 from being a weaker feature set, to the strongest economic value.
  3. Don’t plan on writing notables for ever feature.  It is good to write them for high value/incipient features, and for features you are likely to advertise (in order to get the back story solid before writing the ad copy).  In every product, there is an under-promoted feature.  These sleeper features benefit greatly from writing notables.  Customers buy stuff to solve problems.  But they appreciate additional value that is pulled from products they already have.

Technology Notables – Part 2: Exhaustion v Numbness

This is part 2 in a series of blog post on technology notables.  Part 1 is available here.

The big truth about new product features is that they are exhausting to end users.  End users are worn out by the day-to-day battle of keeping their jobs, keeping their companies alive, and mentally managing the stress of getting things done. The average small business owner has a very limited capacity to incorporate new technology.

But cognitive overload isn’t the whole problem.  Even more important is the product-cycle.  Every business has some kind of product cycle.  In the beginning of a product cycle, a new initiative or product is specified.  Next it is designed and taken through the process of readying it for market.  Product cycles hamper technology adoption, because once you choose a technology and start a product cycle, you can’t change the technology without restarting.  New features can only be helpful to customers, if customers learn them before their next product cycle push.

Software organizations don’t realize how limited customers are in what they can use.  Software organizations assume the more features the better.  Only a few breakthrough features are needed to justify shotgun software development.  So, software organizations develop long lists of new stuff that the end user has no clue why s/he should care about.  In particular, software organizations working from open source, are prone to this habitual product development.   Release after release lists of software feature get longer and longer.  Release after release, these lists drive a wedge between software companies and customers.

It is not that software companies over-promise and under-deliver.  It is that software companies who are not daily in contact with customers become feature numb.  And feature numb software organizations do not know the difference between a big and a small features.

To a customer, a big feature is worth taking the time to understand and then, taking much more time to implement and harvest the feature’s value in use.   To a customer, a small feature is just noise.  That is: “If new features are small, please don’t tell me about them.”  But more importantly: “If this is a small feature, please do not tell me it is a big feature.”  Because, the big small feature lie can and will be held against you.  To a big well-run software organization, a big feature is: (a) a significant challenge to develop, (b) hard for competitors to copy, (c) likely to used by the entire customer base, (d) extends the architecture that is already in place, and (e) a low uncertainty requirement that is well understood.

Feature numb software organizations have leprosy.  They no longer can sense customer-induced pain from the dumb and vestigial features they dump into products.  Without the pain of the cheers and jeers of end users, software development managers begins to manage  with customer myths and self hypnosis.  Recent block buster products and markets become the the only valid target for future development.  Product development and sales both become exercises in extrapolation from the past, and the company marches into the future … facing backwards.

For example, I’m a huge fan of network attached storage, but the latest NAS feature “iSCSI” has exhausted me even before I understand it.  All the NAS companies are pushing iSCSI like Jesus freaks throwing tracts at my face.  As a customer, I have an automatic response to new features dumped over the transom into my life: benign cynicism.   Benign cynicism is where I’m going to make NAS companies pay for telling me small features are big features.   The more they lie, the less I listen.

I admit, this could be unfair to the NAS company.  I may very well need iSCSI.  But, life is not fair, and right now I’m in the middle of a product cycle and I don’t want to hear about iSCSI!   I haven’t got iTunes video streaming working from my NAS yet!  And I’m more NAS literate than average.  Way more literate.  And, by the way, if I have to erase my NAS storage volume to use iSCSI, I declare iSCSI to not exist.

Denial is much easier than backing up and reformatting 3.5 terabytes of data.

Cynics are frustrated idealists.  And even though I’m a benign cynic NAS customer, I’m still a cynic.  So frustrated idealism makes me give up on latent killer features because I’m not listening.  Notables are projectiles for piercing this kind of product cycle and cognitive overload-induced benign cynicism.

Notables follow the theory that the way to every over-taxed stressed out customer’s heart, is through superiority that matters.  It is through understanding the customer, and picking the one feature that the customer can implement in the next year, and explaining your product’s benefit superiority.  And explaining the benefit superiority … enthusiastically.   Notables enthusiastically explain benefit superiority for a few big features.

Notables renegotiate the information deal with customers.  The company says “I realize you have been lied to about small features being big.  In this short page document, I’m going to tell you about a new big feature, that will be genuinely big for you. After you read this document (5 minutes) you will know how this feature will benefit you, or you will know the feature is noise.”

Technology notables over come customer feature exhaustion by the promise of a much higher signal to noise ratio than advertising.  And notables overcome feature numbness, by making software organizations aware that each feature needs a value proposition.  When you think about it, software organizations could do their own market research by writing notables for proposed features, and then listening for the cheers and jeers of users.

Notable Lessons:

  1. Notables are a great customer development tool because you write them and send them out of the company, and they give you a feature-specific signal to listen for customer bounce back.  Notables are sonar for marketers trapped inside a company.  Customers will respond to big benefit feature notables.  So will field sales.  So will product managers.
  2. Most software organizations are sleep walking on autopilot.  They dump features into products and hope for the best.
  3. Feature lists drive a wedge between software companies and their customers.